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‘Nudging’ Healthy Lifestyles: The UK 
Experiments with the Behavioural Alternative  
to Regulation and the Market
Adam Burgess*
This article critically reflects upon the introduction of behavioural, ‘nudging’ approaches 
into UK policy making, the latest in a series of regulatory innovations. Initiatives have 
focused particularly upon correcting lifestyle risk behaviours, marking a significant conti-
nuity with previous ‘nannying’ policy. On the other hand, nudging represents a departure, 
even inversion of previous approaches that involved the overstating of risk, being based 
partly upon establishing a norm that bad behaviours are less, rather than more common 
than supposed. Despite substantive similarities, its attraction lies in the reaction against 
the former approach but must also be understood in the context of the economic crisis and 
a diminished sense of liberty and autonomy that makes intimate managerial intervention 
seem unproblematic. Problems are, in fact, substantial, as nudging is caught between the 
utility of unconscious disguised direction and the need to allow some transparency, there-
by choice. Further, it assumes clear, fixed ‘better outcomes’ but encourages no develop-
ment of capacity to manage problems, contradicting a wider policy intent to build a more 
responsible and active citizenry. More practically, nudging faces considerable barriers to 
becoming a successfully implemented programme, in the context of severe, Conservative-
led austerity with which it is now associated. 
I. ‘Nudge’ crosses the Atlantic
A new Conservative-led Coalition government came 
to power in May 2010 in the UK. They have initiated 
a programme of ‘nudging’ individuals into making 
better choices through manipulating their environ-
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cism of the original article. Also to Tracey Brown, Jerry Busby and 
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1 See speech by David Cameron, “David Cameron attacks UK ‘moral 
neutrality”, Daily Telegraph, 7 July 2008, available on the Internet at 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/conserva-
tive/2263705/David-Cameron-attacks-UK-moral-neutrality---full-
text.html> (last accessed on 11 January 2012).
2 For a mapping of the Conservatives’ agenda see Nick Boles, Which 
Way’s Up? (London: Biteback Books, 2010) by a leading modern-
iser and Cameron advisor. 
ment, as part of a radical programme of transfor-
mation. Alongside wellbeing, transparency and 
decentralisation this experiment with behavioural 
economics is one of the new emphases in govern-
ment thinking. All this is underpinned with the pro-
motion of an ethos of promoting greater personal 
responsibility.1
Conservative Party leader, David Cameron, has 
been engaged in a long term project of creating a 
modern, liberal conservatism. Now in power, and 
despite the limited mandate of a minority govern-
ment, the Coalition have quickly moved to attempt 
a transformation of institutions, and the individuals’ 
relationship to them. Power and responsibility are 
to be devolved to the local level, in an oddly entitled 
project to establish a ‘big society’.2 Even critics are 
agreed that one thing the programme does not lack 
is ambition; it is widely seen as nothing less than a 
cultural revolution in a country historically defined 
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by its gradualism and stability.3 Thus university 
funding has been virtually abandoned, with costs 
passed on to individual students, and much of the 
health budget is to be devolved to the control of local 
doctors. Alongside this large scale cost-cutting, the 
government is encouraging a philosophy of smart, 
cheap and local solutions to a range of problems in 
society, inspired by modern behavioural econom-
ics. The Coalition’s message is to pose the classical 
question: ‘Ask not what society can do for you, but 
what you can do for society’. Their role is to make 
that more possible, be that through making it eas-
ier to do voluntary work, or reduce the burden on 
the health service by encouraging healthier life- 
styles. 
The dramatic change of political direction in the 
UK has been accompanied by a shift in the sources of 
intellectual inspiration. The previous Labour govern-
ment expanded the contribution of social research to 
its ‘evidence based’ programmes, encouraging a lan-
guage of risk avoidance that Cameron made a focus 
of attack during the election.4 The Conservatives, by 
contrast, are drawing upon the disciplines of psy-
chology and economics, with their starting points in 
the abstract individual, rather than social structure 
or context. More specifically, the new government 
is drawing upon behavioral rather than neoclas-
sical economics, which is based on the more real 
and imperfect ways in which the individual makes 
choices, rather than the purely rational actor of 
neoclassical theory. This is combined with insights 
from social psychology – nowhere more clearly and 
attractively than in the bestselling account, Nudge 
by Richard Thaler, often described as the founder 
of behavioural economics, and Cass Sunstein, simi-
larly described as the father of behavioural law and 
economics, and now ‘nudger in chief’ as head of the 
Office of Regulatory Affairs in Obama’s American 
administration.5 The book is a practical manual for 
applying the principles of behavioural economics; 
how institutions can configure ‘choice architecture’ 
to encourage beneficial decision making amongst 
the population. The Conservative modernisers were 
drawn to the practical, non-ideological solutions sug-
gested by Nudge, and Cameron made it obligatory 
reading for his colleagues before the election. By 
mid 2008 the Conservatives were consulting with 
Thaler over specific schemes such as to reduce the 
carrying of knives by young people and increasing 
recycling.6 An example of the kind of solutions being 
explored are American schemes that attempt to re-
duce electricity consumption by providing feedback 
to households on their own and neighbours’ usage. 
The intention is that individuals will try and adjust 
– hopefully reduce – their consumption in line with 
the norm (and thereby reinforcing the norm itself).7 
Behavioural economics, now some 40 years old, 
is not the same as the ‘nudging’ with which it is 
now associated, but lends itself to all manner of ap-
proaches. The boundaries between behavioural eco-
nomics, various forms of ‘nudging’, social marketing 
and psychology are not clear, but they all inform the 
policy mix that is now generally known as ‘nudg-
ing’.8 The language of ‘nudges’ and ‘shoves’ has been 
a relatively familiar one in the US for more than a 
decade.9 There is also a significant crossover between 
behavioural and ‘new governance’ approaches in reg-
ulation.10
Behavioural approaches proceed from the rec-
ognition that we misjudge decisions systematically 
because of our inherent biases and rules of thumb 
for making sense of information. These ‘heuristics’ 
3 Astonishingly, their programme has been frequently described 
as ‘Maoist’ in character. See, for example, Ed Rooksby, “Vince 
 Cable is right: in some ways the coalition is a bit like Maoism”, The 
Guardian, 23 December 2010, available on the Internet at <http://
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/dec/23/vince-cable-
mao-coalition-marxist-capitalism?INTCMP=SRCH> (last accessed 
on 11 January 2012).
4 See Cameron, David Cameron attacks UK’ moral neutrality, supra 
note 1.
5 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving 
 Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness, (London: Yale 
University Press, 2008).
6 As an indication of the extent, and public nature of collaboration, 
Cameron’s second-in-command, Chancellor George Osborne, co-
wrote an article with Thaler – with the unfortunate title, “We can 
make you behave”, The Guardian, 28 January 2010, available on 
the Internet at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/
jan/28/we-can-make-you-behave?INTCMP=SRCH> (last accessed 
on 11 January 2012).
7 See Dora Costa and Matthew Kahn, Energy Conservation “Nudg-
es” and Environmentalist Ideology: Evidence from a Randomized 
Residential Electricity Field Experiment. Presentation at 2010 Pow-
er Conference, Princeton University, available on the Internet at 
<http://academics.hamilton.edu/economics/home/kahn_hamil-
ton_paper.pdf> (last accessed on 11 January 2012).
8 Alongside Nudge, the two key texts now usually cited are Rob-
ert Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (New York: 
Harper Business, 2007), and Ariely, Predictably Irrational, supra 
note. 7. 
9 Dan Kahan, “Gentle Nudges versus Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky 
Norms Problem”, 67(3) University of Chicago Law Review (2000), 
at pp. 607–646.
10 On Amir and Orly Lobel, “Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behav-
ioral Economics Informs Law and Policy”, 108 Columbia Law Re-
view (2008), at pp. 2098–2139.
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were elaborated most famously in the experiments of 
Kahnemann and Tversky, and are laid out in Nudge. 
Among other insights, the distinction between short 
term pleasure and long term benefit is a key one in 
the behavioural armoury, which explains a range of 
our (at least formally) irrational decision making. A 
wide range of behavioural studies continue.11 Whilst 
some seem obvious, even banal, other studies are 
more interesting and useful, such as observation 
of how we choose to pay back the small ones first 
when dealing with multiple loans – despite a higher 
rate of interest on the larger one.12 Another example 
underlines the potentially large impact behavioural 
modification can make, despite the typically modest 
nature of ‘nudges’ in themselves. A field experiment 
in China on the effect of incentives upon produc-
tivity suggests the difference between those framed 
positively and negatively amounted to over 1 % per 
annum; a ‘hugely significant’ difference.13 The col-
lective insights from behavioural studies have been 
drawn together in simple terms through the UK gov-
ernment’s MINDSPACE framework.14  
These approaches are addressed to demonstrated 
patterns of behaviour that are deeply embedded, 
and realistically draws upon them to produce better 
11 For a useful review see, Amir and Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge, 
supra note 10, at pp. 2127–2132.
12 For example, findings that we are more prepared to have unpro-
tected sex when sexually aroused, or that we are more likely to 
steal stationery from work than the financial equivalent. See these 
and other examples in Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: the Hid-
den Forces that Shape Our Decisions, (New York: Harper Collins 
2008). Results are perhaps less surprising than why it was thought 
these issues were thought worthy of investigation in the first place. 
13 This interesting example is cited in the interview with Ariely in 
Matthew Taylor, “Better the devil you know”, RSA Journal, avail-
able on the Internet at <http://www.thersa.org/fellowship/journal/
features/features/better-the-devil-you-know> (last accessed on 11 
January 2012).
14 Cabinet Office and Institute for Government, MINDSPACE: Influ-
encing Behaviour through Public Policy (London: Cabinet Office, 
2010).
15 Ben Saunders, “Normative Consent and Opt-Out Organ Dona-
tion,” 36(2) Journal of Medical Ethics (2010), at pp. 84–87.
16 The Coalition, Our Programme for Government (London: HM Gov-
ernment, 2010) at p. 7, available on the Internet at <http://www.
direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/
documents/digitalasset/dg_187876.pdf> (last accessed 11 January 
2012).
17 David Halpern, Institute for Government blog, “No.2 to No.10: 
Taking Mindspace to Downing Street”, available on the Internet at 
<http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/764/no-2-to-no-
10-taking-mindspace-to-downing-street/> (last accessed 11 Janu-
ary 2012).
outcomes. The contrast here would be with policy 
making that imagines that all human behaviour 
is readily changed, and that it is only a matter of 
finding the right combination of carrot and stick. 
Doing this, it embraces the power of social norms 
and pressures rather than an assumption that sim-
ply changing laws, regulations or policies will be ef-
fective. Nudging’s strength is its practical character. 
It attempts to design around our imperfections for 
positive social ends, recognising that we are typically 
lazy about what we choose not to prioritise, but none-
theless regard as right. An example would be ‘getting 
around to’ agreeing to organ donation, for example, 
something which behavioural thinking sees could be 
changed through establishing an ‘opt out’ rather than 
‘opt in’ system.15 Nudging is grounded rather than 
exhortative, calling into question the assumption 
that more information about negative consequences 
will result in improved behaviours and providing the 
modern policy maker with a fresh and practical per-
spective on a range of problems in society.
The centrality of using behavioural insights to the 
Coalition government is such that it introduces the 
formal written agreement between the Conservative 
and Liberal parties, in the foreword by the two party 
leaders:
“There has been the assumption that central 
government can only change people’s behaviour 
through rules and regulations. Our government 
will be a much smarter one, shunning the bureau-
cratic levers of the past and finding intelligent 
ways to encourage support and enable people to 
make better choices for themselves”.16
They have set up a 7-person ‘Behavioural Insight 
Team’ within the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office – 
a statement of priority on its own, at a time when 
everywhere else in the administration is experienc-
ing significant cuts to personnel. The country’s then 
leading civil servant, Gus O’Donnell, is directly in-
volved, charged with ensuring delivery. Behavioural 
solutions are here considered in the context of a wider 
devolution of power to local communities, the ‘nudge 
unit’ looking to examples from around the world of 
schemes where communities themselves appear to 
have solved problems without the direction of cen-
tral authorities. David Halpern, head of the new unit, 
claims that, in combination with greater transpar-
ency and social network affects it can be ‘genuinely 
transformative’.17 They have now set out their first 
initiatives, centred primarily on eliminating various 
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‘unhealthy behaviours’.18 The strategy is to school 
the civil service in ‘smart’, behavioural solutions to 
social problems. It is through this mechanism that 
they hope to square the awkward contrast between 
a new centralised directing body, and the local ini-
tiative supposedly at the heart of the new project. 
The intention is that officials schooled in the new 
approach will successfully diffuse into local com-
munities the spirit rather than only the prescriptive 
details of what they have learnt from the behavioural 
insight team.
Despite the recent association of modern Con-
servatism with ‘nudge’, it is worth noting that there 
is no necessary political connection along these lines. 
Whilst there may seem to be a natural affinity be-
tween Conservatism’s and economics’ focus upon the 
individual, this is by no means exclusive as ‘socialist’ 
politics has adapted itself in this direction in the UK, 
like elsewhere.19 The ‘MINDSPACE’ research pro-
gramme which shaped the Coalition’s behavioural 
work was commissioned by the previous Labour 
government, and Halpern worked under them.20 In 
the American context, nudge is a Democrat admin-
istration initiative.21 After all, nudging is precisely 
intended to represent an alternative to clear inter-
ventionist approaches; an attempt at a ‘third way’ 
between the regulation associated with the left, and 
‘leave it to the markets’ approach of the right.22 Back 
in the UK, had the Labour Party not been in a period 
of disarray in the mid 2000s it could have been they, 
not the Conservatives, who adopted it as their own. 
II.  Economic crisis and the reaction 
against ‘nannying’
Whatever the political identification, it isn’t self evi-
dent in its own terms why behavioural approaches 
not only have a certain appeal, but have been adopt-
ed in such a wholesale and exclusive fashion. It is 
not driven by compelling evidence that it works, 
especially not as a general approach to a range of 
problems. For the most part it is only evidence-based 
in the sense that proposed schemes are informed by 
particular misperceptions found in experimental set-
tings. 23 It is in this context we can understand why 
the cleverly modified urinals at Amsterdam airport 
are so often cited; not only is the placing of a pretend 
fly a funny example, it is also one of the few clear 
successes.24 More often, examples cited are, actu-
ally, tentative (but tend not to be suitably qualified). 
Certainly, part of the answer to its appeal can be 
located in its post ideological, centrist character. Con-
temporary politics on both sides of the Atlantic has 
increasingly concentrated around a middle ground to 
which nudge solutions seem ideally suited. But more 
important is the wider context of the economic cri-
sis that has undermined faith both in conventional 
economics and the economic system itself. As Dan 
Ariely, one of the principal behavioural economists 
explains: 
“Without the financial crisis, I don’t think behav-
ioural economics would have gained the popu-
larity it has. Almost everyone believed that the 
market was the most rational place on the planet, 
yet it failed in a magnificent way. This proved that 
people who deal with large amounts of money are 
as capable of irrationality – from reckless gam-
bling to myopia and overconfidence – as anybody 
else”.25
Behavioural economics’ contemporary appeal is, in 
this regard, primarily a negative one; in a context 
of disillusionment with conventional assumptions 
and solutions. As one commentator put it: ‘Nudge 
18 Their initial projects are on: smoking, organ donation, teenage 
pregnancy, alcohol, diet and weight, diabetes, food hygiene, physi-
cal exercise, and social care. See “Applying Behavioural Insight 
to Health”, (London: Cabinet Office Behavioural Insights Team, 
2010), available on the Internet at <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.
uk/resource-library/applying-behavioural-insight-health> (last ac-
cessed on 11 January 2012).
19 On the fundamental continuity between recent Labour and Con-
servative administrations, and way in which the Conservatism of 
Margaret Thatcher subsequently shaped Labour policy, see Simon 
Jenkins, Thatcher and Sons: A Revolution in 3 Acts (London: Pen-
guin, 2007).
20 MINDSPACE, Influencing Behaviour through Public Policy, supra 
note 14.
21 For a journalistic account of how nudging is being used in the 
Obama administration see, Michael Grunwald, “How Obama 
is using the science of change”, Time, 2 April 2009, available 
on the Internet at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/arti-
cle/0,9171,1889153,00.html> (last accessed 11 January 2012).
22 Sunstein situates ‘Nudge’ in this context in this interview, avail-
able on the Internet at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DD-
fUJs5t_k> (last accessed 11 January 2012).
23 Lord Alderdice quizzed civil servants applying behavioural solu-
tions, making the useful distinction between ‘informed design’ 
which describes most behavioural ideas, and actually ‘evidence 
based policy’. See House of Lords Select Committee on Science 
and Technology Inquiry on Behaviour Change, Evidence Session 
2 (2 November 2010), available on the Internet at <http://www.
parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/science-technology/
behaviourchange/ucSTI021110ev1.pdf> (last accessed on 20 De-
cember 2010).
24 Men aim at the ‘fly’, reducing spillage.
25 Taylor, Better the devil you know, supra, note 13.
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is relevant in 2009 because it helps us look in the 
mirror’, at our own, and the economic system’s fail-
ings.26 Chancellor George Osborne, the Conserva-
tives second-in-command, made a case for the rel-
evance of behavioural economics to recessionary 
circumstances before they came to power, on the 
basis that not only do individuals behave irrationally, 
but so do markets.27 Its subsequent appeal within 
the British policy making circles is the promise of 
cost effectiveness; achieving ‘more for less’, particu-
larly in public services. The practical emphasis is on 
‘smart’ solutions that do not involve more resources; 
an imperative in recessionary times with a govern-
ment committed to reducing spending.
A second factor explaining the appeal of nudging 
is one particularly relevant in the British context, and 
one that emphasizes why these developments are of 
interest to those concerned with risk and regulation. 
Not only does it promise a potentially a cheaper 
means of dealing with social problems, it is also dis-
tanced from the heavy-handed regulatory approach 
26 Jon Dennis, “We still need a nudge”, The Guardian, 25 March 
2009, available on the Internet at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/2009/mar/25/nudge-economics-social-policy> (last 
accessed on 11 January 2012).
27 Andrew Sparrow, “Nudge Economics still relevant in recession”, 
Guardian blog, 8 April 2009, available on the Internet at <http://
www.guardian.co.uk/politics/blog/2009/apr/08/nudge-george-os-
borne> (last accessed on 11 January 2012).
28 The notion of ‘nannying’ derives from the phrase the ‘nanny state’; 
that is an overly interventionist style of government that dictates to 
its citizens like a grandmother (‘nanny’).
29 Reaction to this description prompted a direct response from the 
authors; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, “Libertarian Pater-
nalism Is Not an Oxymoron”, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. (2003), at p. 1159, 
and expanded on in Nudge (pp. 4–6). This has been the subject 
of much further debate, such as in Amir and Lobel, Stumble, Pre-
dict, Nudge, supra note 6.
30 These initiatives were, somewhat paradoxically, initiated by La-
bour governments. They were, practically, marginalised however, 
most clearly with the Risk Regulation Advisory Council created by 
Gordon Brown.
31 Andrew Lansley, “A New Approach to Public Health”, 7 July 2010, 
Speech to Faculty of Public Health conference, available on the 
Internet at <http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/MediaCentre/Speeches/
DH_117280> (last accessed on 11 January 2012).
32 Cited in Duncan Brown, “Hazardous drinking, the middle class 
vice”, The Times, 16 October 2007, at p. 7.
33 See ‘Burn off Christmas with a walk, BBC News Online, 22 Decem-
ber 2009, available on the Internet at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
health/8425433.stm> (last accessed 11 January 2012).
34 Heavy drinking in public is an endemic not epidemic phenomenon 
in the UK; a long established cultural trend. At the same time it is 
still subject to considerable fluctuation because of shifts in social 
behaviour, such as the decline in young people’s drinking in the 
later 2000s. See Adam Burgess, “The Politics of Health Risk Pro-
motion. ‘Passive Drinking’: A ‘Good Lie’ Too Far?” 11(6) Health 
Risk and Society (2009), pp. 527 et sqq. p. 536.
identified with the previous administration. In this 
sense it marks an important marker of identity for 
a new administration that otherwise shares much 
in common with its similarly centrist predecessor. 
The Coalition promote ‘nudging’ as an alternative to 
the legislative restrictions and ‘nannying’ of the La-
bour years, showing that government can do more 
than ‘leave it to the market’ but without expensive, 
intrusive and unpredictable interference.28 Thaler 
and Sunstein describe their approach as both ‘pa-
ternalist’ and ‘libertarian’, and it is the latter aspect 
that is emphasized in the UK case, as the Coalition 
distinguishes itself from its predecessor.29 From 
this perspective the behavioural initiative can be 
placed in the deregulatory thrust of recent British 
‘better regulation’ initiatives: the Better Regulation 
Executive, Better Regulation Commission and Risk 
Regulation Advisory Council.30 The Coalition agree-
ment foreword cited above declares that it will be 
a ‘smarter one’ than its Labour predecessor, which 
resorted to ‘bureaucratic levers’ all too often. Health 
Secretary, Andrew Lansley, counter posed Labour’s 
excessive legislative zeal and ‘nannying’ to his ‘new 
approach to public health’, heavily framed by nudg-
ing, in July 2010.31 
The backdrop here is a contemporary politics of 
heightened risk aversion and precaution that reached 
its climax under the last Labour government, far too 
narrowly presented now as simply one of a bossy 
‘nannying’. This is not to say that there was no ‘nan-
nying’; sweeping, paternalistic criticism of unhealthy 
behaviours became relatively routine. For example 
back in 2007, without embarrassment or qualifica-
tion, then Public Health Minister, Dawn Primarolo 
told off middle class, “everyday” drinkers who have 
drunk too much for too long. This has to change’.32 
Another health minister, Gillian Merron instructed 
us how best to spend our Christmas holidays: “What-
ever the weather, a traditional festive walk is a great 
way for families and friends to avoid that sluggish 
feeling and have a more active Christmas.’33 But such 
pronouncements were part of a much wider promo-
tion of risks intended to stimulate a change of think-
ing and behaviour. High alcohol and food consump-
tion were presented as polarised and simple matters 
of life and death, and as dramatic and implausibly 
recent and fixed epidemics.34
A wide range of prominent risks – from terror-
ists, paedophiles and possible disease threats, to pur-
ported dangers from chemicals, food and alcohol – 
were politicised and brought to public attention. At 
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the same time the belief was encouraged that risk 
might somehow be eradicated if sufficient energy 
and resources were dedicated to it, and all obstacles 
to this agenda eliminated.35 To an extent this was 
through the classical modern form of a punitive law 
and order agenda, stimulated by outrageous criminal 
incidents in the intensely reactive political culture of 
those years. During his decade in power Tony Blair 
presided over more than 3000 new laws, 1000 of 
which carried jail terms.36 But a wider range of con-
temporary risks to individual health and safety were 
politicised during these years. Ministers found them-
selves having to promote various health anxieties 
that acquired a life of their own – often through the 
media. Thus Health secretary John Reid appeared in 
a populist newspaper under the headline, ‘I salute 
the Sunday Express for its hospital crusade’ (over 
‘super bugs’), back in 2003. Here he rehearsed what 
became a well-worn ritual of government adapting 
itself to what the media indicated were popular con-
cerns and anxieties.37 Characteristically the laws and 
regulations that emerged in these contexts were hast-
ily and badly drafted, reflecting the fact that they 
were substantially a means of demonstrating that 
government was ‘doing something’ about whichever 
new risk had been thrust to the centre of attention.38 
Not unfairly this has been described as: ‘truckloads 
of legislation simply to send out signals, make a point 
or obtain a headline’.39 
Health became a particular focus for risk concerns 
in a wider landscape of risks that required manage-
ment and vigilance. As public anxieties were seen 
to centre upon risks to health, it became natural to 
engage with, and expand these concerns. It is strik-
ing that Gordon Brown chose the promise of uni-
versal health screening as a last ditch effort to save 
his Premiership, in his re-launch, in late 2009, for 
example. Health risks even became the villains in a 
curious new populism, such as when Brown called 
on manufacturers and the European Union to take 
action against food additives, following the publica-
tion of a single study suggesting they might affect 
children’s behaviour in 2007.40 The appeal of prom-
ises to remove risk required that it first be elevated, 
and there was, in effect, an approach of attempting 
to alarm the public into behavioural change. This is 
most widely recognised in relation to how the threat 
of terrorism was relentlessly promoted by both La-
bour premiers, and draconian legislation passed to 
combat this allegedly pervasive threat.41 But, again, a 
wider range of risks became a focus for politicisation. 
Alarming representations of risk to stimulate public 
responses became relatively routine in the Labour 
years, from dramatising and denying uncertainty 
around climate change, to inventing notions of ‘pas-
sive drinking’ by the Chief Medical Officer.42 This, 
latter example, illustrates a process of unchecked 
regulatory expansion and over confidence; it was 
success in banning ‘passive smoking’ that created 
both a need for a new campaigning focus, and the 
confidence to construct a further, but this time im-
plausible, target.
This process of risk dramatisation and expan-
sion involved a range of characteristic techniques, 
among which were the denial of any uncertainty, 
reliance upon the most dramatic examples, and use 
of worst-case scenario projections as realistic models. 
There is some generalised recognition of, and reac-
tion against this approach in behavioural thinking. 
Cialdini’s widely-cited policy making ‘big mistake’ 
is to imply that problem behaviours are relatively 
widespread.43 This form of risk politics centred on 
making problems appear of more immediate and 
pervasive dimensions than they really are, is the op-
posite of the nudge device, which is to underplay 
them instead. The idea is to make individuals believe 
the social norm is different, typically lower, than 
35 For a substantial account of these developments in the UK see 
 Michael Moran, The British Regulatory State: High Modernism 
and Hyper Innovation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
An important policy response was provided by the Better Regu-
lation Commission, Risk, Responsibility and Regulation – Whose 
Risk is it Anyway? (London: Better Regulation Commission, 2006). 
This provided the basis for developing the Risk Regulation Advi-
sory Council.
36 Philip Johnston, Bad Laws (London: Constable, 2010), p. 10 et sqq.
37 See Adam Burgess, “Media Risk Campaigning: From Mobiles 
Phones to Baby P”, 13(1) Journal of Risk Research (2010), pp. 59 
et sqq., at p. 69.
38 For example, the Safeguarding Vulnerable Persons Act – which 
subjected all adults coming into contact with children on any 
regular basis to regulation – was so badly drafted that it required 
250 amendments by the end of its parliamentary progress. The Act 
was a response to the publicity generated by the murder of two 
schoolgirls by a school caretaker, Ian Huntley, and the subsequent 
public inquiry.
39 Johnston, Bad Laws, supra note 39, p. 36.
40 Paul Webster and Dennis Sanderson, “Brown’s plea to take the ad-
ditives out of children’s food”, The Times, 7 September 2007. p. 5.
41 Most controversially, Labour’s anti terrorism was pursued through 
‘control orders’ – virtual house arrest – and through a 28-day de-
tention for suspects. These were major behind-the-scenes contro-
versies for the Coalition government who were formally committed 
to their abolition but eventually only moderated them.
42 Burgess, The Politics of Health Risk Promotion, supra note 34.
43 Cialdini, Influence, supra note 8.
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they imagine in the case of consumption, stimulat-
ing them to adjust their behaviour and eat, drink 
and smoke less, or consume less energy. Whilst the 
agenda may not be radically different – particularly 
the promotion of lifestyle risk avoidance – the means 
of doing so certainly is.44 To an extent, nudge repre-
sents recognition of the failure of an old risk politics 
perfected during the Labour years in the UK, even 
whist the fundamental agenda remains unques-
tioned.
III.  Managerial project in an era  
of devalued freedom?
A third factor explaining nudge’s contemporary ap-
peal is a further negative one; that barriers to its ap-
plication have fallen away. The impact of psycholog-
ically-based behaviourism has long been the subject 
of concern about its impact upon civic freedoms and 
rights, but these concerns are less marked in the late 
twentieth and early twenty first centuries.45 Attach-
ment to concepts of liberty and autonomy were dis-
mantled in the 1990s, as Wilson eloquently explores; 
relegated by the imperatives of risk avoidance and se-
curity.46 The managerial regime of Tony Blair’s New 
Labour regarded civic freedoms as an inconvenience, 
the removal of which should be of no concern in 
an enlightened age. They then accelerated a longer 
term decline in even an understanding of the case 
for liberty. Individual liberties were systematically 
compromised; rendered of only token value in the 
context of the fight against international terrorism, 
and other threats. 
44 Lansley’s speech (A New Approach to Public Health, supra note 
31) makes clear that he shares a similar agenda to his predecessors 
– from targeting obesity to amplifying the threat of flu epidemic.
45 Jerry Willis and Donna Giles, “Behaviourism in the Twentieth 
 Century: What we Have Here is a Failure to Communicate”, 9(3) 
Behaviour Therapy (1978), pp. 15–27.
46 Ben Wilson, What Price Liberty? How Freedom was Won and is 
Being Lost (London: Faber and Faber, 2009).
47 Wilson, What Price Liberty?, supra note 46, pp. 285–338.
48 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: 
Sage 1992).
49 Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, Individualization (Lon-
don: Sage 1992).
50 Behavioural Insights Team, Applying Behavioural Insight to Health, 
supra note 18, p. 13.
51 Behavioural Insight Team, Applying Behavioural Insight to Health, 
supra note 18, p. 25.
Contemplating society-wide application of behav-
ioural solutions assumes a fundamentally pliant and 
passive population that attaches limited value to indi-
vidual liberty and autonomy. It is inconceivable that 
nudging could be contemplated in a more contested 
and charged environment, such as the Britain of the 
1970s, dominated as it was by class conflict. In short, 
behavioural solutions developed in the laboratory 
seem viable when society itself can be envisaged in 
similar terms. In this sense the Coalition’s nudging 
owes a debt to Labour’s elevation of risk and security 
and diminution of liberty, no matter how much they 
might counter-pose their initiative, and identify itself 
with a libertarian agenda.
There is a wider backdrop here, of the diminish-
ing meaning of privacy in the age of Facebook and 
Google, and an ‘actuarial society’ shaped by amoral 
probabilistic calculation.47 There is also a greater 
fluidity of social norms and assumptions in the late 
modern ‘risk society’.48 This is an individualized so-
ciety where each is prone to greater insecurity, and 
assumption that institutionalised security should be 
paramount. Beck’s sense of individualization also 
points to the fracturing of social norms, making the 
assumptions involved in everything from raising 
children to the etiquette of sexual encounters un-
clear.49 In such an environment of social uncertain-
ty behavioural solutions can seem both necessary 
and viable. Attempting to manipulate patterns of 
drinking and related problems of unwanted sexual 
encounters (in the university context) is one of the 
first schemes announced by the ‘Nudge unit’, and 
illustrates an attempt to influence more fluid contem-
porary social norms.50 
It is in the context of the much blanker contem-
porary social canvass that we can understand the 
surprising confidence of behavioural proponents 
– surprising when we remember that, for the most 
part, they only have experimental results rather than 
clear, applied successes. Concluding their first report 
where they set out some tentative experiments, the 
nudge unit declare that: ‘There is no reason why 
we cannot succeed in tackling today’s rising tide of 
chronic lifestyle-related disease’.51 Given that unrav-
elling the relationship between, for example, lifestyle 
factors and environmental and genetic influences on 
ill health remains difficult and contested, such dec-
larations seem unreasonably bold. The relationship 
between behaviour and health is a complex one, as 
is the interface between what is a risk and benefit to 
the individual, and society as a whole. The ‘preven-
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tion paradox’, for example, tells us that for one indi-
vidual to benefit, a far larger number have to change 
their behaviour – even though they gain no benefit 
themselves, or even suffer, from the change.52 More 
generally, sustainably transforming social norms 
through manipulation – even in combination with 
other approaches – is not a strikingly attainable ob-
jective, yet this remains the temper of current be-
havioural declaration. With few apparent obstacles 
to experimentation and allowed free rein, it seems 
behaviouralism can become an inflated project with 
limited self restraint.
It can be argued that there is a relative under-
playing of how behavioural solutions can be recon-
ciled with issues of liberty and responsibility, issues, 
we should recall, that are supposedly central to the 
 Coalition vision. Certainly by implication, behaviour-
alism challenges the moral autonomy at the heart 
of modernity. Contesting its assumptions, one com-
mentator thus called for: 
‘... an injection of a bit of the old Enlightenment 
idea, that humans are autonomous agents who 
can shape the world. Indeed, Locke and Mill 
 argued specifically that people would be able to 
make choices that others would consider stupid 
or wrong’. 53 
More substantially, Bovens highlights behaviour-
alism’s absence of concern for the development of 
moral independence, instead tending to infantilize 
those for whom it directs choices.54 A lack of concern 
for such important matters of principle is partly be-
cause ‘nudging’ is inherently technocratic; it is about 
solutions to assumed problems, and wider issues do 
not readily figure in its landscape.55 But relevant also 
is the overconfidence of an approach whose time has 
apparently come. 
This is not to say that normative issues are ig-
nored. Nudge has a dedicated afterword, engaging 
objections and criticisms. Explaining his approach in 
the House of Lords, Halpern volunteered his concern 
on the ‘legitimacy of who is making those choices 
about choices’ at the end of his contribution:
“That’s actually a pretty big deal and a profound 
one, not least since many of the choices we make 
in the moment actually aren’t the ones that we 
would make on reflection. I guess it’s an argument 
that applies in many areas of science, but, boy, it 
applies in this one. You can’t stray too far from the 
legitimacy and the public permission of what you 
are doing. You already see, actually, some of the 
reaction against this early work, that people feel 
worried about it, and “is it illiberal” and “is this 
Orwellian?” Well, at local or national level, if you 
want to take these kind of approaches, particularly 
some of the more controversial ones like priming, 
you actually just have to have that public permis-
sion. You are going to have to have the discussion, 
the debate, where the public give you permission 
to do the framing around the choices. And if you 
don’t do that I think you can get in deep trouble. 
So you have to answer this agency point both at 
the individual level but also at a more collective, 
reflective level”.56
What is striking, even as Halpern acknowledges that 
there are issues of legitimacy and agency, is that his 
unit was immediately operationalized by the Coali-
tion without pause for reflection, and the contradic-
tion between a wider libertarian agenda and behav-
iouralist programme not even recognised, let alone 
addressed. Schemes such as to reduce the amount of 
sex university students may be having are explored 
without hesitation, suggesting how marginalised 
concerns for privacy and liberty have become. It 
would appear to confirm that a managerial approach 
to society is firmly established, and manipulating in-
formation for the ‘greater good’ of avoiding risk or 
improving behaviour unremarkable and assumed to 
be unproblematic. In this context it is important to 
further consider – here at least – some of the substan-
tive problems.
52 The paradox was first put forward by statistician Geoffrey Rose, 
“Strategy of prevention: lessons from cardiovascular disease”, 282 
British Medical Journal (1981), pp. 1847–51.
53 Alan Miller, “Let’s Banish Nudges and Bans”, Huffington Post, 
available on the Internet at <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-
miller/nudges-and-bans-lets-bani_b_781651.html> (last accessed 
on 11 January 2012).
54 Luc Bovens, “The Ethics of Nudge”, in T.Yanoff-Grune and 
S.Hansson (eds.) Preference Change (New York: Springer, 2009), 
available on the Internet at <http://www.bovens.org/TheEthicsFV.
pdf> (last accessed on 11 January 2012).
55 See Kyle Powys Whyte and Evan Selinger, “Competence and Trust 
in Choice Architecture”, 23 (3-4) Knowledge, Technology & Policy 
(2010), pp. 461–482.
56 House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology 
Inquiry on Behaviour Change Evidence Session 1 (9 November 
2010), available on the Internet at <http://www.parliament.uk/doc-
uments/lords-committees/science-technology/behaviourchange/
ucSTI021110ev1.pdf> (last accessed on 20 December 2010).
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IV.  Problems of transparency  
and learning responsibility
There are matters of competency and trust in the 
design of choice architecture.57 Thaler and Sunstein 
address such concerns and their ultimate defence of 
nudging is on the grounds that it’s a process that 
inevitably goes on anyway. This is an important ob-
servation, as is the fact – more generally with regu-
lation – that the choice is often between different 
forms rather than between regulating or not. But 
it is equally important to also look further, to who 
is doing the designing, on what basis and to what 
effect.58 As individuals, many of us effectively de-
sign our own choice architecture in the knowledge 
of foibles and weaknesses; for example I don’t have 
fattening snacks available in my larder when I’m try-
ing to lose weight, in order to remove the temptation. 
This is an informed choice subject to revision, based 
on my own priorities and changing knowledge. This 
example, of weight loss strategies, illustrates well the 
necessity for continual monitoring of strategies in 
the light of evolving knowledge, rather than assum-
ing it is a matter only of technique and application. 
There remains uncertainty around how best to lose 
weight, complicated by the possible negative effects 
upon health of carbohydrate-limiting diets.59 Per-
haps most importantly, my nudge is still part of an 
overall regime of, hopefully improving, self control 
which is not neglected or precluded by the resort to 
manipulating (my own) unconscious biases.
Beyond the individual, there is less choice in-
volved in other forms of nudging undertaken by 
authorities, such as redesigning tax forms to pre-
57 For a useful philosophical critique, see Whyte and Selinger, Com-
petence and Trust in Choice Architecture, supra note 54.
58 Bovens also makes this point, The Ethics of Nudge, supra note 55, 
p. 12.
59 Recent analysis now tends to suggest that they are at least as 
 effective, probably more so than traditional fat and calorie con-
trolling diets. See for example, Michael L. Dansinger, Joi Augustin 
Gleason, John L. Griffith et al., “Comparison of the Atkins, Ornish, 
Weight Watchers, and Zone diets for weight loss and heart disease 
risk reduction: a randomized trial”, 293(1) Journal of the American 
Medical Association (2005), pp. 43–53. Increasing recognition that 
weight loss may be better achieved through limiting carbohydrates 
also illustrates the often counter-intuitive nature of biological pro-
cesses, as becoming less fat is not necessarily best done by eating 
less fat.
60 Bovens discusses this issue interestingly, suggesting that nudge 
needs to preserve at least ‘in principle’ rather than ‘actual’ token 
interference transparency; that we could, at least theoretically, be 
able ‘to identify the intention of the choice architecture and she 
could blow the whistle if she judges that the government is over-
stepping its mandate.’, The Ethics of Nudge, supra note 55, p. 13.
vent common mistakes, or crime prevention cam-
paigns that aim to reduce its occurrence. Whilst 
such schemes are less open and less clearly involve 
autonomous choice, they retain a foundation in es-
tablished procedure and assumption in a democratic 
society, making compliance with established rules 
and regulations easier. Tax must be paid and crime 
avoided, and nudges to facilitate these ends have le-
gitimacy. Nudges based upon transparent rules and 
regulations are ultimately based upon a democratic 
consensus that is itself subject to modification. Be-
havioural manipulation is more problematic when 
tied to commercial ends, where society recognizes a 
need for recourse and even protection from advertis-
ing and marketing that is subliminal or deliberately 
deceptive. Similar concerns arise when the state di-
rects us to behavioural change that unreasonably 
denies choice or agency, whether through more tra-
ditional or more behavioural means. It is because of 
this problem that the proponents of nudge wish it to 
retain a degree of transparency, leaving it to open to, 
at least, theoretical exposure.
An important part of nudge’s justification is 
that an element of choice is preserved, unlike with 
more heavy-handed regulatory responses such as 
legal bans. This requires – somewhat awkwardly – 
that nudges remain visible rather than subliminal; 
awkward because externally administered nudges 
are likely to work best precisely when they are not 
transparent; can we really all be ‘in on’ the nudge?60 
On the demanding terms of being both sufficiently 
masked to bypass too much conscious attention yet 
still recognizable to the whistleblower who detects 
an infringement of liberty, few nudges can be strictly 
defined as such. This awkward balance is reflected 
in the difficult description of being both ‘libertarian’ 
and ‘paternalist’.
There is another fundamental contradiction in 
nudging, particularly in the context of the declared 
intent to increase a sense of individual responsibility 
outlined by the Prime Minister. Whilst there may 
be an attempt to provide at least token interference 
transparency to preserve the possibility of exposing 
a ‘nudge too far’, this also underlines how far this 
process is from one that encourages greater learn-
ing about problems and how the individual might 
take on some responsibility for their management. 
Behaviouralism directs us away from building the 
renewed sense of personal and social responsibility 
the Coalition government has set out as fundamental 
to its mission. Its advantage lies in psychologically 
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‘accepting us as we are’, utilising this to produce bet-
ter outcomes. This same approach is problematic 
in similar terms, the flip side being disengagement 
from the possibility of moral or educational improve-
ment. 
We don’t learn much in the behavioural universe. 
Bovens asks the important question: 
“Does it increase our capacity for self control?’ The 
problem is that – at least theoretically – this is un-
likely; indeed the opposite appears more likely...To 
warrant long-term success, we should let people 
make their own decisions while providing mini-
mal aid. My point is that short-term success of 
Nudge may be consistent with long-term failure. 
The long-term effect of Nudge may be infantili-
sation, i.e. decreased responsibility in matters re-
garding one’s own welfare”.61
What happens when the nudging stops, with a 
change of government for example? There is a logi-
cal case to say that not only will we be confronted 
with the problem afresh, but even less capable of 
dealing with it, having grown accustomed to it be-
ing dealt with by others – with only our, primarily 
unconscious, passive involvement. Or perhaps our 
behaviour will have been successfully reoriented to-
wards the better outcomes? Actually, biases may be 
at least partially ‘corrected’ more consciously. Self 
knowledge about biases such as to clear many small 
loans instead of tackling the large one can lead us to 
try and not do that anymore. As Bovens points out, 
there is no proof either way about whether genuine 
preference change will result, and it remains a mat-
ter for empirical study. At the very least, however, 
such uncertainty and absence of evidence suggests 
the need for greater caution and humility. Yet the op-
portunity to socially experiment made by the dimin-
ished value attached to liberty, among other factors, 
has determined an absence of appropriate restraint. 
V. Better outcomes?
In traditional democratic terms, we must consider 
the minority who are unhappy or unwilling to be 
nudged into better or healthier choices, and to this 
end the process must remain one open to scrutiny. 
Those who might decide against being directed to-
wards ‘improved outcomes’ may be irrational in eco-
nomic terms, but even in economics a more social 
and contextual view has developed. We now recog-
nise that ‘happiness’ and ‘wellbeing’ are relatively 
independent of financial circumstances, suggesting 
a wider sense of rationality and fulfilment.62 
Behavioural economics, like the discipline more 
generally, tends toward an abstract, socially-blind 
sense of ‘irrational’ behaviour that takes no account 
of values. Yet research suggests, for example, that 
the success of American schemes using nudge to re-
duce electricity usage are dependent upon political 
values; unsurprisingly, whilst it works with liberals, 
it can backfire with some conservatives.63 This is a 
useful one in indicating that those unwilling to be 
nudged might be significant, even a majority. Reject-
ing ‘better outcomes’ might also be a less clear cut, 
political, question of values. Consider our ‘irrational’ 
bias towards paying off small loans rather than tack-
ling the larger ones, even though we are likely to 
pay more interest as a consequence. Actual people 
– this author included – choose to limit engagement 
with financial affairs on the basis that the gains are 
small compared to the cost of activity which we find 
particularly tedious. In fact, we must all do this to 
some degree as there is always more energy that can 
be spent saving money – always more research that 
could be done into switching loans and reorganising 
finances – so a decision remains to be made about 
the point at which we stop and the balance against 
other aspects of our lives. In other words, it may 
not be (financially) rational if we were to assume an 
actor focused upon maximizing returns, but it can 
well be functional on the basis of particular beliefs, 
choices and options. Alternatively, we can say that 
economics tends to work on the basis of an implau-
sibly narrow conception of what is rational, or not.
Even in cases of relatively unambiguously better 
outcomes, these remain relative and implementa-
tion requires careful weighing up on a longer time 
frame. All policies and actions have unintended 
consequences.64 Nowhere is this a more important 
recognition than when thinking through risks and 
61 Bovens, The Ethics of Nudge, supra note 55, p. 11.
62 Laura Camfield, Gina Crivello and Martin Woodhead, “Wellbeing 
Research in Developing Countries: Reviewing the Role of Qualita-
tive Methods,” 90(1) Social Indicators Research (2009), pp. 5–31; 
Bruno Frey, Happiness: A Revolution in Economics, (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2008).
63 Costa and Kahn, Energy Conservation “Nudges” and Environmen-
talist Ideology, supra note 7.
64 Robert Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purpo-
sive  Social Action, 1(6) American Sociological Review (1936), at 
pp. 894–904.
EJRR 1-2012 Inhalt.indd   12 22.02.12   09:37
EJRR 1|2012 Symposium on Nudge – ‘Nudging’ Healthy Lifestyles 13
benefits. Risk management is a process of complex 
negotiation of trade-offs and exchange.65 Risks mi-
grate from one site to another rather than simply 
disappear through policy or design.66 Consider a well 
intentioned behavioural changes brought about, in 
this case, by legal sanction. Compulsory cycle helmet 
wearing leads to a fall in the numbers of children 
in particular, who cycle, as it becomes a regulated 
rather than more spontaneous experience.67 Initia-
tives can have counter intuitive effects such as how 
doing ‘our little bit’ for the environment by recycling 
might curtail any impulse to take more significant 
action. Meanwhile, any relationship of the domestic 
recycling ‘ritual’ to slowing, let alone stopping global 
warming is, to say the least, uncertain.68 Such com-
plexity can all too easily be ignored in behavioural 
scheming focused on short term solutions.
Matters of expanded public health and its relation-
ship to individual choice are among the most com-
plex in modern society. The idea of putting fluoride 
into the water supply, from the 1940s, to protect the 
teeth of those who might not do so themselves might 
be considered an early behavioural nudge. But it has 
rightly provoked half a decade of debate, as have 
65 John D. Graham and Jonathan Wiener, Risk vs Risk: Trade-offs in 
Protecting Health and the Environment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press 1995); W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and 
Private Responsibilities for Risk (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1992).
66 Ruth Alcock and Jerry Busby, “Risk migration and scientific ad-
vance: the case of flame-retardant compounds”, 26(2) Risk Analy-
sis (2006), pp. 369–381.
67 The most comprehensive study into the effects comes from Aus-
tralia. For example, data from Western Australia shows the number 
of Australian children walking or riding a bicycle to school plunged 
from about 80 % in 1977 to the current level around 5 %. This fall 
directly coincided with the introduction of compulsory helmet 
wearing. See the compilation of research, Bike numbers in Western 
Australia, available on the Internet at <http://www.cycle-helmets.
com/bicycle_numbers.html> (last accessed on 11 January 2012).
68 Sarah Moore and Adam Burgess, “Risk rituals?”, 14 Journal of Risk 
Research (2011), pp. 111–124.
69 Allan R. Freeze and Jay Lehr, The Fluoride Wars: How a Modest 
Public Health Measure Became America’s Longest Running  Political 
Melodrama (London: Wiley, 2009). David Smith, Young-In Kim and 
Helga Refsum, Is Folic Acid Good For Everyone? 87(3) American 
Journal of Clinical Nutrition (2008), pp. 517–533.
70 See the Behavioral Diabetes Institute, for example, available on the 
Internet at <http://behavioraldiabetesinstitute.org/about-Behavio-
ral-Diabetes-Institute.html> (last accessed on 11 January 2012).
71 See Sendhil Mullainathan’s talk on these issues, available on the 
Internet at <http://www.ted.com/talks/sendhil_mullainathan.html> 
(last accessed on 11 January 2012).
72 Adita Chakkraborty, “Brain Food”, The Guardian G2, 7 December 
2010, at p. 5.
73 Catherine Bennett, “Oh, Mr Cameron, do stop all that annoying 
nudging,” The Observer, 5 December 2010, at p. 43.
more recent initiatives such as putting folic acid into 
flour to reduce the number of babies born with spina 
bifida and neural tube defects.69 ‘Better outcomes’ 
– particularly in the complex world of health and 
human behaviour – are far from given, particularly 
concerning untargeted interventions such as these. 
Where better outcomes are largely incontestable, 
nudging only makes sense where the problem is 
clearly behavioural rather than one of resources or 
technology, leaving only quite particular foci for in-
tervention. Increasing usage of oral rehydration salts 
to treat diarrhoea, particularly in India, is one impor-
tant example, having a potentially significant effect 
on the still shocking levels of infant mortality from 
this treatable condition. The technological problem 
has been fundamentally solved, and nor is it a basic 
question of resources, as salts are widely available. 
The problem is to behaviourally encourage mothers 
to remember to medicate. Diabetes is a disease which 
can be effectively treated but requires vigilant self 
management, and it no surprise that behavioural so-
lutions are also the focus of extensive research and 
initiative, including the UK ‘nudge unit’. 70 At the 
same time such examples may be more an exception 
than a rule; diseases which are agreed, significant 
and stubborn problems with a simple solution but 
requiring some applied thinking. We should add that 
even in these examples there is rarely such a thing as 
an exclusively behavioural issue, however. In more 
traditional terms the problem in India also remains 
one of education, with many women still fundamen-
tally misunderstanding how diarrhoea should be 
treated and not recognizing the life-saving potential 
of the salts. 71 
VI.  The continuity of lifestyle risk 
intervention 
Despite the relative absence of substantive contest-
ing of nudging, its implementation by the Coalition 
has stimulated, largely negative, commentary. One 
liberal columnist typically complained that: ‘Cam-
eron’s hijacking of Nudge theory is a classic example 
of how big ideas get corrupted’, affirming the sense 
that it is the application rather than substance that 
is the subject of criticism.72 A withering tone was 
captured by the title of another: ‘Oh, Mr Cameron, 
do stop all that annoying nudging.’ 73 Again, this 
article did not contest the substantive, intervention-
ist aim, however; indeed it complained that nudging 
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will be insufficient, as we: ‘can’t rule out a surge in 
obesity, hyperactivity or mass poisoning’. The prob-
lem, particularly for critics of the liberal left, is that 
corporate players like food manufacturers will not 
now be frozen out of regulation as they tended to 
be under Labour, but will also play their part in im-
proving health lifestyles. Those closely aligned with 
health promotion initiatives write dramatically of a 
complete reversal in public health because industry 
will no longer be sidelined.74 The polarised politics of 
risk consolidated under the previous government in-
volved an at least rhetorical hostility towards corpo-
rate influence, and this has left a considerable legacy. 
Other critics have attacked the British application of 
nudging on the grounds that it wrongly precludes 
more regulation and legislation to promote health.75
Hostility towards nudge is as pronounced from 
the anti-regulatory right, as it is from the left. For 
example, influential conservative commentator 
 Melanie Phillips writes of the ‘happy mind benders 
of No.10’76 Criticism has been such that ministers 
have responded in public.77 
To an extent, this is a predictable problem for an ap-
proach that deliberately steers itself between left and 
right. The result can be to satisfy neither side, whilst 
aggravating both. But the more particular aspect is 
that nudge is being adopted at a time of austerity, by 
a Conservative-led government. Both left and right 
complain that their cherished services are being cut 
dramatically; for the former, public services and jobs 
are the focus, whilst for the right it is cuts to the de-
fence and policing budgets that rankle. Government 
experiments involving American-imported ideas, in 
this context, can become the focus of resentment and 
ridicule. For those angered already by funding cuts, 
Conservative initiatives are part of an ideological 
 offensive to ‘roll back’ the state and make ordinary 
citizens and initiative pay for services themselves. 
The background is here is a longstanding popular 
mistrust of Conservative policies as being dishonest 
and hypocritical, and memories of cuts under the 
infamous administration of Margaret Thatcher and 
her successors. There is a suspicion that the rhetoric 
of freedom and responsibility is only a cover for mar-
ket domination, and nudge can be seen as the latest 
attempt to justify reductions in state spending. This 
is in a context where Coalition policy as a whole is 
regarded by critics as driven by an ideological hostil-
ity towards state spending (on the poor) – rather than 
determined by the dire economic circumstances of 
the UK economy, married with a determination to 
shift power towards the local and individual.78 Cam-
eron has assiduously sought to distance himself from 
traditional conservatism through adopting new ideas 
such as nudge. But the imperatives of recession have 
confounded both his distancing from traditional con-
servatism, and nudge’s independence of either left or 
right. In this respect, the recessionary circumstances 
that have helped thrust nudging to the fore have also 
led to the compromising of it as a policy approach, as 
behavioural economics becomes not so much ‘smart’ 
policy as austerity policy. Experimental conditions 
for behaviouralism have turned out to be less ideal 
than might first appear.
Finally, it is important to recognise that the 
grounds upon which nudge policy making in the UK 
is not being criticised; the appropriateness of govern-
ment attempts to shape health lifestyle behaviours, 
or that this is a self evident ‘good’. There are objec-
tions to partnership with industry in schemes to 
encourage ‘healthy behaviour’, but concern is that 
the worthy objective of improving people’s lifestyles 
might be compromised by association with com-
mercial actors. There is little criticism of objectives 
themselves and in this respect we can identify a 
triumph of lifestyle health interventionism. At the 
same time it is significant that nudging initiatives 
are, thus far, concentrated primarily in this domain, 
precisely because health improvement now stands as 
74 See, for example, Joe Millward, “Letting the food industry shape 
policy will ruin a century of progress”, The Guardian, 3 December 
2010, at p. 17.
75 Chris Bonell, Martin McKee, Adam Fletcher et al., “Nudge Smudge: 
UK Government Misrepresents ‘nudge”’, 377 The Lancet (2011), 
early online publication, 17 January 2011, available on the Internet 
at <http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736(11)60063-9/fulltext> (last accessed 11 January 2012).
76 Melanie Philips, “The happy mind-benders at No.10,” Daily 
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ten?searched=mind-benders&advsearch=oneword&highlight=aja
xSearch_highlight+ajaxSearch_highlight1> (last accessed 11 Janu-
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77 Francis Maude, “The nudge is no fudge”, The Guardian, 27 De-
cember 2010, available on the Internet at <http://www.guardian.
co.uk/commentisfree/2010/dec/27/nudge-fudge-community-level> 
(last accessed 11 January 2012).
78 The impulse behind Coalition policy remains a debateable ques-
tion. But in my view, critics tend to act as if financial restrictions 
simply do not exist – yet they are plainly real. Further, an example 
like the transformation of higher education suggests that the ideo-
logical determination to shift the focus of power is predominant. 
The changes in higher education are likely to cost the state more 
in the long term, as a large proportion of the new student loans 
will not be paid back. Meanwhile, the immediate consequence is 
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a kind of universal imperative. A rare critic from in-
side the medical profession terms this the ‘tyranny of 
health’.79 By contrast, there is little sign of schemes 
in more difficult areas where there is no such con-
sensus.
Critical reflection allows an appreciation of the 
lifestyle health consensus as a distinctive, even curi-
ous development. Basic public health has long been 
established. We thankfully live in an era of, remark-
ably, still ever-increasing life expectancy and, at least 
in the developed world, the eradication of infectious 
disease. Attention has shifted towards the much 
more uncertain world of lifestyle risk, but often as 
if problems and solutions in how people choose to 
live their (unhealthy) lives are matters of will and re-
sources like public health in the past, and can be eas-
ily framed around unambiguous choices. Yet whilst 
in the world of health promotion and experimental 
nudging the choice is a simple one between, say, the 
‘good’ fruit juice and ‘bad’ fizzy drink, in reality it 
is not nearly so clear cut. The ‘natural’ sugar in fruit 
juice will rot teeth as surely as the ‘unnatural’ in 
fizzy drinks, and the choice of one over the other 
is essentially a lifestyle choice marking distinctions 
of taste and class.80 It is misleading to distinguish 
consumption around ‘goods’ and ‘bads’, as diet is fun-
damentally a matter of balance, based around the 
often-confirmed maxim that ‘all things are best in 
moderation’. More useful is to consider how health 
has become intimately connected to morality; more 
79 Michael Fitzpatrick, The Tyranny of Health: Doctors and the Regu-
lation of Lifestyle (London: Routledge, 2000).
80 For thinking socially about matters of taste, see Pierre Bourdieu, 
Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
81 Allan Brandt and Paul Rozin, Morality and Health: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives, (London: Routledge, 1997).
82 Angela Raffle and J.A. Muir Gray, Screening, Evidence and Prac-
tice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
83 Maintaining ‘good health’ in the past was not generally regarded as 
an end in itself – as tends to be the case today – but simply as the 
bodily prerequisite for moral, intellectual and practical achieve-
ment. Those unreasonably concerned were known as ‘hypochon-
driacs’, a term which also indicates the necessary connection with 
unending concern about even the most minor possible threats to 
health.
84 Fitzpatrick, The Tyranny of Health, supra note 79.
85 Christopher Booker and Richard North, Scared to Death (London: 
Continuum, 2009).
86 Virginia Bottomley, “Health of the Nation”, Hansard, 8 July 1992, 
Vol. 211, cc.335, available on the Internet at <http://hansard.mill-
banksystems.com/commons/1992/jul/08/health-of-the-nation> 
(last accessed 11 January 2012).
87 Booker and North, Scared to Death, supra note 85.
a modern way of denoting ‘responsible’ behaviour 
than simply reflecting upon the state of bodily func-
tions.81 We might like our children to be more active 
and walk to school, for example, but there is no clear 
purpose to making children ‘fitter’, and it is clear 
that exercise has only the most limited impact upon 
weight loss – should that be the objective. 
Matters become even more complex when we 
consider the impact of actual programmes intended 
to improve health, particularly those ‘preventative’ 
schemes intended to identify illness in its early stag-
es. These are fraught with unintended consequences, 
such as the false positives and unnecessary treat-
ment that accompany the ‘good’ of mass screening 
programmes.82 Such problems are not resolved sim-
ply by nudging people into more regular screening 
or undertaking self examinations. Meanwhile, it is, 
at least historically, uncontentious to suggest that the 
singular pursuit of health in its own terms and for its 
own sake is not necessarily a ‘healthy’ one.83 Among 
the consequences are the ‘worried well’, and how the 
intense scrutiny of health and consumption provides 
an environment conducive to health alarms.84 It 
would seem to be no coincidence that the UK has 
witnessed so many ‘panics’ around food since the 
1980s, around everything from eggs, to cheese, to 
meat, as the elevation of health – and risks to it – has 
been particularly clear and political.85
It was the previous Conservative administration 
that began the politicisation of lifestyle health sub-
sequently consolidated under Labour. It was their 
‘Health of the Nation’ White Paper back in 1992 – 
with its 27 targets on issues from teenage pregnancy 
to taking more exercise – that signalled the new, ex-
panded health agenda. It was unveiled by the then 
Health Secretary:
Honourable Members will know that people have 
become more conscious about what they eat, how 
much exercise they take and how they can gener-
ally improve the quality of their lives by becom-
ing healthier. We wish to build on that healthy 
trend. No responsible Government can be a dis-
interested observer of an unhealthy nation. We 
should prevent illness wherever we can ... Preven-
tion is better than cure.86
Food health alarms encouraged by a climate of health 
politicisation began under the Conservatives also, 
following another health minister’s declaration that 
‘all eggs have salmonella’ in 1988.87 More dramatic 
and widely targeted health initiatives also began in 
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the late 1980s, with the campaign to alarm the whole 
population into believing that they were all at risk 
from AIDS.88 Likewise, more media-driven risk poli-
tics was initiated during this period, with the passing 
of the Dangerous Dogs Act in 1991, which banned 
certain breeds of dog, following a single attack on a 
schoolgirl.89 As the Conservatives are now innovat-
ing the politics of nudge, it was they also who, earlier, 
innovated those of risk and health ‘nannying’.
Nudge is less of an alternative than is being 
claimed to the ‘nannying’ of the past, particularly 
as it enters an environment where lifestyle health 
interventionism is already well established as the 
norm. In this context ‘nudge’ is only the latest ad-
dition to the portfolio of interventionist approaches, 
rather than an alternative to it. Any libertarian prin-
ciple is subsumed; for example in the government’s 
new policy proposals on health which state, at one 
point, that: ‘The Government will take a less intru-
sive approach, staying out of people’s everyday lives 
wherever possible.’90 More importantly, the docu-
ment and policy are then structured around the Nuf-
field Council of Bioethics Ladder of Interventions, 
which ‘increases in intrusiveness’ from ‘do nothing’ 
to ‘eliminate choice altogether’. All behaviours seem 
open to intervention in these terms, with no sense 
of limits or boundaries. There are here only some 
 ‘minor’ behaviours trends that can be left alone as 
they may ‘fizzle out’, and these are only one out of 
8 options. In practice, a range of new initiatives tar-
geting lifestyle risk have been unveiled that now 
involve corporate as well as public health actors.91
Nudge has been adopted in the UK in an uncritical 
and wholehearted way, to the exclusion, for exam-
ple, of valuable work on better regulation that bet-
ter engaged with the damaging politics of risk in 
the contemporary UK.92 Unveiled at the same time 
as the Coalition’s wider programme of change, its 
 attraction lay in offsetting the sense of austerity for 
austerity’s sake. But in the context of severe econom-
ic cuts and widespread reaction against them, the 
plans to nudge behaviour have been drowned out 
by criticism. Meanwhile, more substantive problems 
with behavioural solutions remain uncontested. The 
technocratic assumption of ‘better outcomes’ ignores 
complex realities, and nudging crucially limits the 
possibility of conscious learning and improvement. 
But it is not only nudging in its various forms that 
requires examination and debate, but the wisdom 
and consequences of the fixation on lifestyle health 
issues and where the limits to all forms of direct 
 external interference lie.
88 See Burgess, The Politics of Health Risk Promotion, supra note 34, 
p. 537.
89 See Johnston, Bad Laws, supra note 34, p. 62.
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for Public Health in England, (London: HM Government, 2010).
91 Behavioural Insight Team, Applying Behavioural Insight, supra 
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92 See, for example, BRC, Whose Responsibility, supra note 33. Risk, 
Regulation Advisory Council, Response with Responsibility: Policy 
Making for Public Risk in the 21st Century, (London: BIS, 2009).
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